Nāgārjuna asserts: “I have no thesis”, but many of his interpreters assumed that he must have at least an implicit set of principles and beliefs.

Do you think that philosophy can successfully be conducted if one member of a discussion refuses to articulate any doctrinal commitments, or is Nāgārjuna arguing in bad faith by only attacking opponents' theses without providing any indication of what he may or may not believe?

Nāgārjuna claims that an arguments validity relies on it having substantial groundings; however, he contends that everything lacks substance and therefore thesis have no argumentative power. The nature of Nāgārjuna’s argument suggests that all that oppose him have no argumentative power due to their lack of “substance,” which is explained through the theory of emptiness. Similarly, the discussion of “negation and existence” which entails that despite an arguments significance it must be false, is disproven by his argument. However, while Nāgārjuna does not intend to attack his opponents’ theses and instead shows that all arguments are false, his logic would discard the groundings of his own. As such, the philosopher diminishes the argumentative power of his opponents’ theses, but in doing so he unsuccessfully upholds his own arguments validity as he does not articulate any doctrinal commitments.

Nāgārjuna claims that “I have no thesis” as he believes that all theses are invalid as they “lack substance,”^[1]therefore his own proposition is unable to be classified as a thesis. Under The Status of the Theory of Emptiness, the philosopher discusses that there are two horns. The first horn implies that if arguments are to be insubstantial, then “the substantialist’s view that substances do exist”¹ is invalid. However, the second horn investigates the opposing side to his view, that “if it does have argumentative power it must be substantial,” though he concludes that “the universal thesis that everything lacks substance has to be false.”¹ For instance, his analogy involving “chariots, pots, and so forth, which are dependently originated”¹ are in fact empty, which he correlates with the concept of a thesis without substance. However, he again contradicts this statement, stating that they are “obviously capable of fulfilling a variety of functions.”¹ He furthers this claim through examining epistemology, which questions the theory of knowledge. For a thesis to be believed as valid, it must be supported by evidence gathered from reputable sources. While all theses include valid evidence, Nāgārjuna’s opponent expresses his concern that perception, inference, testimony, and likeness, “cannot provide any basis for our knowledge of the world if they, like everything else, are regarded as empty.”¹ As such, the philosopher demonstrates an eagerness to invalidate opponents arguments through posing the belief that all arguments lack authenticity.

Moreover, Nyāya’s theory of language exemplifies the argumentative power of Nāgārjuna’s argument, for it seamlessly discards the theory. Nyāya’s theory stems from the idea that all “simple terms in a statement have to connect with entities in the world.”¹ This theory suggests that if an object is absent, it does not mean that it does not exist as it exists somewhere else. Therefore, Nāgārjuna’s claim that there is no substance at all is false, as it is not possible for that substance to not exist initially. Conversely, the nature of Nāgārjuna’s theory contradicts this as a meaningful statement such as “emptiness does not exist.”¹ where “emptiness” must exist as it has a referent. As such, the philosopher disputes Nyāya’s theory through using its own logic against it. While he has not supported his argument by articulating doctrinal commitments, he pursues the idea that “his negation only makes the non-existence of substance known but does not bring it about,” therefore suggesting that substance cannot exist, regardless of it having a referent. His proposition demonstrates that there are two sides to an argument, hence his theory having “two horns,” enabling him to counter all of his opposition’s defences. It is through contending against all opposing views which reveals the argumentative power that his treatise holds, implying that there is no need for doctrinal commitments.

For a thesis to be valid, it requires proven evidence in order to form a sound argument; however, Nāgārjuna’s argument would examine as to what makes the evidence itself valid. The issue with the argument is that it contradicts itself, as it suggests that all arguments are invalid, and therefore it must be invalid itself. From this perspective, the argument loses its argumentative power and poses the idea that Nāgārjuna’s is in fact arguing in bad faith of his opponents. To an extent, he may seek enjoyment in contradicting those that oppose his views. Nevertheless, he still provides a treatise that is capable of diminishing the value of all arguments. If he were to uphold the strength of his argument by removing its own contradiction from the equation, then he would successfully pose a philosophy that does not require articulation of doctrinal commitments. As such, by asserting that he has no thesis, he then provides a valid claim as he has conceded with his idea that all theses are false. In turn, he has revealed that there cannot be a true thesis, but only propositions, for there are always two sides of an argument, which is exemplified through his ability to counter each of his opponents’ views.

Ultimately, Nāgārjuna’s treatise demonstrates to the reader that philosophy can be conducted successfully without attending to doctrinal commitments, as he successfully counters each of his opponents’ views. While the theory is flawed in that it does not have underlying support, he proves that philosophy is a matter of posing views and beliefs rather than a sound thesis that can be contradicted.

^[1] Westerhoff, J. (2010). Introduction. Oxford University Press EBooks, 3–18. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199732692.003.0001

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